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Abstract 
Based on the theoretical background of the link between countries’ 
transparency and environmental policy our paper provides empirical evidence 
for a sample of 68 countries for the time period of 2001-2010. By assuming 
that countries’ transparency levels shape their environmental policy which 
reflects upon their environmental performance levels, we develop an empirical 
model for investigating such a relationship. By modifying a conditional 
directional distance function model, we incorporate on the measurement of 
countries’ environmental performance the effect of their public sector 
transparency levels. The empirical results indicate that public sector 
transparency has a statistically significant impact on countries’ environmental 
performance with the relation in the case of emerging-developing economies 
appearing as an inverted ‘W’ shape, whereas in the case of advanced-
developed economies indicating an inverted ‘U’ shape. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is a significant problem of our society and it is spreading 
across public sector. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) bureaucrats are 
enhanced with the power to manage public properties. If bureaucrats are self 
interested, they may exploit this power in order to achieve personal gains to 
the detriment of public interest. This power is referred to as discretionary 
power (Jain, 2001). 
Environment and especially environmental regulations is an area where 
corruption is a common issue. Environmental regulations are imposed and 
monitored by bureaucrats who may be corrupted and act for their personal 
interest (Damania, 2002).  According to Bulte et al. (2007) rural subsidies are 
given to wealthy farmers who either bribe or make political contribution to 
the officials in order to receive the subsidies. Governments which are more 
corrupted tend to offer more subsidies to agricultural production and 
especially wealthy producers against public goods. The authors claim that 
subsidies are considered as inefficient economic tools for social policy and they 
are related to low agricultural and land productivity, distortion of the prices 
and trade, expansion of the rural land and deforestation.  
Fredriksson (1997) states that subsidies directed to reduce 
environmental degradation may result to its increase while Lopez and 
Galinato (2007) argue that government’s subsidies either on public or private 
goods have a significant effect on economic development. If the government 
reduces subsidies on private goods, ceteris paribus, it will have a positive 
effect on rural per capita income and it will reduce poverty and environmental 
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degradation. Corruption can lead to environmental degradation in terms of 
land conversion and as result deforestation (Barbier et al., 2005). The lower 
agricultural yields are the greater deforestation will be because farmers need 
more agricultural land to produce the same level of output as if the 
agricultural yields were higher and it is possible for them to convert forest 
land to serve their purpose (Angelsen, 1999). The author argues that this is 
true only for poor farmers but Bulte et al. (2007) found that this also stands 
for wealthy farmers if the government which provides subsidies is corrupted. 
   A number of scholars point out that economic integration may put 
pressure on government for less stringent environmental regulations, in favor 
of the polluting industry and employment (Damania et al., 2003). Industries 
which are environmentally non-friendly often form a lobby in order to achieve 
less stringent environmental regulations and avoid the costs of applying new 
and cleaner technologies (Damania, 2001). A corrupted government favors the 
creation of these special interest groups whose purpose is to extract policy 
concessions to serve their interests. Political considerations may lead these 
industries to reject friendly for the environment investments even if they 
mean lower production costs (Damania, 2001). According to Fredriksson et al. 
(2004) there are three aspects that lead to a special interest group’s success. 
Namely, the incentives of the lobby group to offer a bribe, its ability to 
coordinate bribery and government’s willingness to be bribed.  
Our paper by following the theoretical models indicating that 
countries’ public corruption levels influence their environmental policies, 
develops a model in order to provide empirical evidences for such a 
relationship. Based on the work of Simar and Vanhems (2012) our paper 
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modifies Färe and Grosskopf’s (2004) directional distance function model 
incorporating bad outputs in order to account for the effect of countries 
public sector corruption levels. More specifically, we propose a conditional 
directional distance function model with the treatment of bad outputs1 in 
productivity analysis, which is conditioned on the effect of countries’ public 
sector transparency levels. As a result we will be able to model the effect of 
countries’ transparency levels on their environmental performance and thus to 
have a direct measurement of the effect of corruption on countries’ 
environmental policies as has been suggested on the theoretical models by 
several authors (Damania, 2001, 2002; Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and 
Svensson, 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004; 
Fredriksson et al., 2004).   
2. Literature review 
Aidt (1998) demonstrate that competition between special interest 
groups is significant for the internalization of economic externalities, which 
combines Coasian and Pigouvian approaches to environmental policy. 
According to the Coasian approach, affected groups will act in accordance 
with their goals. Rather than protecting their interests via private agreements 
with high transaction costs, they choose political market to minimize them. 
According to the Pigouvian approach, a corrupted bureaucrat with 
discretionary power fulfills the demands of special interest groups to the 
detriment of public interest. Thus, Aidt (1998) concludes that Coasian and 
                                               
1 Färe et al. (1989) were the first who treated pollutant as ‘bad’ output  in a environmental 
production process by imposing strong and weak disposability. 
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Pigouvian approaches are connected under the public-choice axiom of political 
self interest.  
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) develop an environmental policy 
theory based on corruption and political instability. According to their theory 
corruption has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental 
regulations but this effect fade away as political instability increases. This 
happens because political instability means that the lobby group may bribe 
the government but the government may not maintain its power enough to 
implement the desirable regulation. Corruption related to environmental 
issues is also more commonly found at developing countries where political 
instability is higher and institutions are weaker, less effective and more 
corrupted (Lopez and Mitra, 2000).  
According to Bimonte (2002) quality of institutions positively affects 
environmental quality. Damania (2002) points out that in developing 
countries corruption is considered as one of the main factors of environmental 
degradation. This is a consequence of the way people confront life. According 
to Arrow (1995) in poor countries material welfare is more important 
compared to environmental degradation. Desai (1998) finds empirical evidence 
for the relationship of environmental degradation and corruption by 
examining ten developing countries. Lopez and Mitra (2000) provide also 
evidence that corruption increases pollution levels for any given level of 
income. 
Bulte et al. (2007) examine the case of Latin America, where fifty 
percent of governments’ subsidies are directed to private goods. Among 
others, they were targeted to selected producers with specific crops and free 
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services were aimed for wealthy users, like irrigation services. These subsidies 
have caused many problems such as deterioration of development, decrease of 
productivity, excessive conversion of forest to agricultural land and depletion 
of natural resources. Barbier et al. (2005) highlight conversion of the forest to 
agricultural land as the main factor of tropic deforestation in Central America 
and Amazonia, where the government supports cattle ranching forestry and 
large-scale agriculture. Meanwhile, in Asia, South America and Africa 
deforestation is a result of government’s support to large scale plantations, 
timber harvesting and cash crops. The authors state that these policies are 
also responsible for the depletion of natural resources and loss of biodiversity. 
Fredriksson et al. (2004) study the effect of corruption on energy 
policy. They found three remarkable results which reveal that corruption’s 
effect on energy policy is identical to corruption’s effect on environmental 
policy. First, more corruption of the bureaucrats means less stringent policies. 
Second, increased coordination costs of the special interest groups means more 
stringent policies. Third, capital owners and workers have opposite lobbing 
interests on energy policy.  
Damania et al. (2003) investigate the relationship between corruption, 
trade and environmental policy and their results converge with the results of 
Fredriksson et al. (2004). To be more specific, more corruption results to less 
environmental stringency although more trade policy liberalization results to 
more stringent environmental regulations when the level of corruption is high. 
According to Fredriksson (1999), in a system of perfect competition, open 
trade increases the incentives of a special interest group to put pressure on 
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government’s decision on environmental policy, when the country has a 
comparative advantage in the polluting sector. 
According to Welsh (2004) corruption affects pollution directly and 
indirectly. Direct impact refers to the effect of corruption on pollution while 
indirect influence refers to the effect of corruption on per capita income and 
the resultant impact on pollution. Cole (2007) applies Welsh’s theory of direct 
and indirect impact in the case of corruption’s impact on air pollution. He 
finds a positive direct impact of corruption on per capita emissions while the 
indirect impact was found to be larger than the direct but negative. 
Fredriksson et al. (2003) find direct and indirect impact of corruption acting 
as an environmental stringency. When more bureaucrats become corrupted 
environmental policy tends to become less stringent and this is the direct 
effect. When the level of corruption rises, more bribes tend to be offered. The 
increased number of bribes tends to lower bribe’s price given to each 
individual and the result of this indirect effect is a more stringent 
environmental policy. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
 In our study we use a sample of 68 countries2 for the time period 2001-
2010 in order to measure their environmental performance levels. Based on 
                                               
2 Developed Countries (24): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States of America. 
Emerging, Developing Countries (44): Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam (IMF Advanced Economies List, 2012, p.179-183). 
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several other studies similar to ours (Färe et al., 1989, 1996, 2004; Färe and 
Grosskopf, 2003; Chung et al., 1997; Tyteca, 1996, 1997; Picazo-Tadeo and 
García-Reche, 2007; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2009) we use two inputs, capital 
stock3 and total labour force (in thousands) and two outputs, real GDP (in 
US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions)4 and total 
CO2 emissions (in million tones)
5. Finally our external variable is corruption 
perception index (CPI)6 which measures for each country the degree to which 
public sector’s corruption is perceived to exist. 
3.2 Measuring countries’ environmental performance 
Following the model proposed by Färe and Grosskopf (2004) we let 
 P x to denote an input vector Nx  which can produce a set of 
undesirable outputs 
Ku (in our case carbon dioxide emissions-CO2) and 
desirable outputs 
Mv  (real GDP). Then in order to determine the 
environmental technology several assumptions are needed to be taken 
following Shephard (1970) and Färe and Primont (1995). We assume that the 
output sets are closed and bounded and that inputs are freely disposal. In 
addition  P x  can be an environmental output set if: 
                                               
3 We have calculated capital stock by using the perpetual inventory method:     1(1 )t t tK I K  
where 
tK  is countries’ gross capital stock in current year; 1tK  is the gross capital stock in the 
previous year; 
tI  is the gross fixed capital formation and  represents the depreciation rate of 
capital stock. In our study, following Zhang et al. (2011), we set  equal to 6%. 
4 Data of capital formation, total labour force and real GDP were obtained from UNCTAD 
Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.  
5 Data were obtained from two sources: 1) Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center: 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov and 2) United Nations Statistics Division: 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid=.  
6 Many studies (Gokcekus and Knörich, 2006; Gokcekus, 2008; Gundlach and Paldam, 2009; 
Hanousek and Koćenda, 2011 ) have used CPI as a proxy of corruption with a scale from 0 
(perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). For details 
see: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb.  
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1.    ,v u P x  and  0 1  then      ,v u P x  (i.e. the outputs are 
weakly disposable) and 
2.    ,v u P x ,  0u  implies that  0v  (i.e. the null jointness assumption 
of good and bad outputs). 
In order to formalize the environmental technology we use the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) framework.  
Let  1,...,k K be the observations and then the environmental output 
can be formalized as: 
   









  

 
 
 



1
1
1
, : , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
0, 1,...,
K
k km m
k
K
k kj j
k
K
k kn n
k
k
P x v u v v m M
u u j J
x x n N
k K
     (1) 
 , 1,...,k k K   indicate the intensity variables which are not negative and 
imply constant returns to scale7.  The inequality on the good outputs and the 
equality on the bad outputs help us to impose the weak disposability 
assumption and only strong disposability of good outputs. However the null-
jointness is imposed by the following restrictions on bad outputs: 


 
 


1
1
0, 1,..., ,
0, 1,..., .
K
kjk
J
kjj
u j J
u k K
         (2) 
                                               
7Our environmental efficiency measurement follows the most common assumption made in 
Economics which is the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption. In addition the CRS 
assumption provides us with greater discriminative power among the examined countries.  
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Furthermore, we apply the directional distance function approach as in 
Chung et al. (1997) to be able to reduce bad and expand good outputs8. In 
order to be able to model that in the directional distance function setting we 
use a direction vector   ,v ug g g , where  1vg  and   1ug . Then the 
efficiency score for a country 'k can be obtained from: 
 
   

 

  
' ' '
' '
, , ; max
. . ,
k k k
k k
v u
D x v u g
s t v g u g P x
        (3) 
In this way, the linear programming problem can be calculated as: 
  
 
 






  
  

 



' ' '
'
1
'
1
'
1
, , ; max
. . , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
0, 1,..., .
k k k
K
k km k m vm
k
K
k kj k j uj
k
K
k kn k n
k
k
D x v u g
s t v v g m M
u u g j J
x x
k K
     (4) 
Efficiency is next indicated when   ' ' ', , ; 0k k kD x v u g and inefficiency 
by   ' ' ', , ; 0k k kD x v u g . Due to the fact that we are using the efficiency scores 
derived in a second stage analysis we present the efficiency scores obtained in 
terms of Shephard’s output distance function. In fact according to Chung et 
al. (1997) Shephard’s output distance function is a special case of the 
directional distance function and can be calculated as: 
      
 
, , 1/ 1 , , ; ,k k k k kD x v u D x v u v u                 (5) 
 
                                               
8 This is the most common assumption made for directional distance functions when 
measuring environmental efficiency levels.  
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3.3 Conditional directional distance functions incorporating bad outputs 
In the principles of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2006, 2007) who extent the 
probabilistic formulation of the production process firstly introduced by 
Cazals et al. (2002), let the joint probability measure of  ,, v uX Y  and the 
joint probability function of  , .,.v uXYH  be defined as
9: 
     , , , ,, Prob ,v u v u v u v uXYH x y X x Y y                (6) 
Moreover the following decomposition can be obtained as: 
             , ,, , , ,, Prob Probv u v uv u v u v u v u XXY Y XH x y Y y X x X x S y x F x   (7) 
where    xXxFX  Prob  and      , , , ,Probv u v u v u v uY XS y x Y y X x . 
Additionally, let rRZ  denote the exogenous factors to the production 
process (in our case is countries’ transparency levels). Then equation (6) 
becomes: 
      , , , ,, Prob ,v u v u v u v uXY ZH x y z X x Y y Z z               (8) 
which completely characterizes the production process.  
According to Daraio and Simar (2005) the following decomposition can be 
derived: 
     
   
    

,
,
, , ,
,
,
, Prob , Prob
,
v u
v u
v u v u v u
XY Z
v u
X ZY X Z
H x y z Y y X x Z z X x z
S y x z F x z
         (9) 
The estimator of the conditional survival function introduced above can be 
obtained from: 
                                               
9 For simplicity of presentation, ,v uY  symbolizes both bad  u and good  v  outputs. 
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     
   



 




,
, ,
, 1
,
1
, ,
,
,
v u
n v u v u
i i h iv u i
Y X Z n
i h ii
I Y y X x K Z z
S y x z
I X x K Z z
                  (10) 
where      1, /h i iK Z z h K Z z h  with  .K  being a univariate kernel 
defined on a compact support (Epanechnikov in our case) and h is the 
appropriate bandwidth calculated following Bădin et al. (2010)10. 
Recently Simar and Vanhems (2012) developed the probabilistic 
characterization of directional distance function taking the general form of: 
          , ; , sup 0 , 0x y XY x yD x y g g H x g y g                        (11) 
and the conditional directional distance function of  ,x y  conditional on 
Z z can then be defined as: 
           , ; , sup 0 , 0x y x yXY ZD x y g g z H x g y g Z z           (12) 
Based on these developments the probabilistic form of Färe and Grosskopf ’s 
(2004) model (presented previously) measuring country’s environmental 
performance will take respectively the form of: 
           ,' ' ' ' ' ', , ; , sup 0 , , 0v uk k k k k kv u v uXYD x v u g g H x v g u g       (13) 
In addition the conditional form of the model in (13) will take the form of: 
           ,' ' ' ' ' ', , ; , sup 0 , , 0v uk k k k k kv u v uXY ZD x v u g g z H x v g u g Z z  (14) 
Finally, the DEA program for the environmental performance score for 
a country 'k  when using the conditional output oriented directional distance 
function can be calculated as: 
                                               
10 The calculation of bandwidth by Bădin et al. (2010) is based on the Least Squares Cross 
Validation (LSCV) criterion introduced by Hall et al. (2004) and Li and Racine (2007). 
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  
 
 

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 

 

 

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'
1,...,
'
1,...,
'
1,...,
, , ; , max
. . , 1,..., ,
, 1,..., ,
0, 1,...,  such that .
k
k
k
k k k
v u
k km k m vm
k K
Z z h
k kj k j uj
k K
Z z h
k kn k n
k K
Z z h
k k
D x v u g g z
s t v v g m M
u u g j J
x x
k K Z z h
                   (15) 
3.4 Determining the effect of countries’ public sector transparency levels 
In order to identify the effect of countries’ public sector transparency 
levels11 on the obtained environmental performance levels without specifying 
in prior any functional relationship, our paper applies a nonparametric 
regression. Following, Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008) let us have a 
random variable X  (countries’ public sector corruption levels) with a 
probability density function (PDF) ( )f x . Then the Gaussian kernel  K x  can 
be defined as: 
 



21
21
2
x
K x e                        (16) 
and the PDF of ( )f x  can be obtained from: 
 


   
 

1
1 n i
i
X x
f x K
nh h
                       (17) 
where h represents  the bandwidth calculated by the least squares cross-
validation data driven method as suggested by Hall et al. (2004).  
                                               
11 Transparency is the inverse of corruption. Transparency in government is often credited 
with generating government accountability. Transparency often allows citizens of a 
democracy to control their government, reducing government corruption, bribery and other 
malfeasance (Frederick, 2011, pp. 1346-1350). 
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In addition let us have the variable Y  to denote countries’ conditional 
environmental performance [  ' ' ', , ; ,k k k v uD x v u g g z ]12. The joint PDF of  
( , )X Y  can be defined as: 
 


   
        

1
1
,
n
i i
ix y x y
X x Y y
f x y K K
nh h h h
                   (18) 
where ( , )x yh h are representing the bandwidths calculated by the least squares 
cross-validation data driven method and  .K represents the Gaussian kernel 
defined previously. 
The conditional PDF between the two variables accordingly can be 
obtained from: 
     
  
 , /g y x f x y f x                                 (19) 
Then our nonparametric regression will have the general form of:  
  Y g X u                        (20) 
but as we don’t know the functional form of  .g  we will estimate it 
nonparametrically using kernel methods. In order to obtain the estimation we 
will need to interpret  g x  as the conditional mean of   Y  given X .  
If we let Y andX be the dependent and independent variables 
accordingly 
 ( Conditional Environmental Efficiency levels,  Transparency levels)Y X  
following the proof from Li and Racine (2007, p. 59),     g x E Y X x  then 
                                               
12 It has been shown from Jeong et al. (2010) that the efficiency estimates are consistent (i.e., 
estimate the true inefficiency). Moreover they have a fast rate of convergence and also the 
exogenous variable (i.e. countries’ transparency levels) is assumed to directly influence the 
shape of the frontier (i.e., a separability condition is not assumed). Therefore, the obtained 
efficiency estimates are determined by the inputs, outputs (good and bad) and the exogenous 
variable (for details see Simar and Wilson, 2007, 2011).  
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 E Y X is the optimal predictor of Y  givenX . In this way we can estimate 
   g x E Y x  by13: 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 


1
1
n i
ii
x
n i
i
x
X x
Y K
h
g x
X x
K
h
                              (21).  
 
4. Empirical results  
Following the related theory (Damania, 2001, 2002; Damania et al., 
2003; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Fredriksson 
and Millimet, 2004; Fredriksson et al., 2004) we assume that the shape of 
countries’ environmental production frontier is determined by countries’ 
public sector corruption levels and by the inputs/outputs used. As such the 
efficiency of countries’ environmental policies, which are subject to their 
public sector corruption levels will be reflected on their obtained conditional 
environmental performance levels.  
Table 1 provides the results of the conditional environmental measures 
for the 68 countries for the time period of 2001-2010. As can be observed the 
highest efficiency values in average terms are reported for 2004 (0.7322) and 
for 2007 (0.705), whereas the lowest performance has been observed for 2002 
(0.5877) and for 2009 (0.5845). Also the highest standard deviation of 
countries’ environmental performance is reported for 2010 (0.1729). 
Figure 1 presents per year analysis of the number of countries having 
an environmental performance score above the reported average values. 
                                               
13 Equation (26) represents the local constant estimator introduced from Nadaraya (1964) and 
Watson (1964). 
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Additionally, it indicates the number of countries being environmentally 
efficient over the examined time period. For the year 2010 nine countries are 
reported to be efficient with seventeen countries scoring above the average 
environmental performance values. It also appears a decrease on the number 
of countries scoring above average environmental value during the period 
2007-2009.  
Table 1: Environmental efficiency scores conditional to countries’ transparency 
levels  
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 0.5800 0.5276 0.5498 0.6380 0.5615 0.5719 0.6015 0.6034 0.5257 0.5785 
Austria 0.5250 0.5253 0.5476 0.6778 0.5575 0.5688 0.6109 0.5937 0.5150 0.5771 
Azerbaijan 0.9567 0.6900 0.6519 0.6373 0.6131 0.6637 0.7521 0.7461 0.5482 0.5415 
Bangladesh 0.5500 0.5451 0.5689 0.7060 0.5665 0.5715 0.5937 0.5783 0.5185 0.5167 
Belgium 0.5386 0.5444 0.5723 0.6798 0.5875 0.6040 0.6601 0.6722 1.0000 0.6136 
Bolivia 1.0000 1.0000 0.5892 0.8571 0.5986 0.6308 0.6811 0.6730 0.5366 0.5346 
Botswana 0.5750 0.5676 0.6654 0.6602 0.7201 0.6960 0.7159 0.6626 0.5331 0.5371 
Brazil 0.5421 0.5356 0.5570 0.9303 0.5888 0.6179 0.6798 0.6904 0.5466 0.9275 
Bulgaria 0.6380 0.6228 0.7377 0.6796 0.7174 0.7363 0.7957 0.7675 0.5510 0.5459 
Canada 0.5434 0.5409 0.5713 0.7090 0.5935 0.6136 0.6495 0.6313 0.5323 0.9537 
Chile 0.5562 0.5483 0.5820 0.8712 0.6159 0.6530 0.7149 0.6720 0.5220 0.5276 
China 0.6076 0.6011 0.6210 0.7357 0.6867 0.7703 0.9791 1.0000 0.6582 0.9269 
Colombia 0.5977 0.5813 0.6061 0.6930 0.6360 0.6482 0.7131 0.6811 0.5318 0.5356 
Costa Rica 0.5661 0.5625 0.5942 0.7491 0.5953 0.6244 0.6730 0.6449 0.5322 0.5317 
Croatia 0.5652 0.5654 0.6141 0.6325 0.6246 0.6408 0.6970 0.6726 0.5310 0.5284 
Czech Republic 0.5278 0.5310 0.5555 0.6358 0.5748 0.5938 0.6347 0.6321 0.5252 0.5319 
Denmark 0.5259 0.5266 0.5488 0.5822 0.5619 0.5716 0.5971 0.5805 0.5163 0.5672 
Dominican Republic 0.5324 0.5312 0.5376 0.7361 0.5643 0.5747 0.6078 0.5918 0.5199 0.5195 
Ecuador 0.5720 0.5714 0.6147 0.6136 0.6283 0.6490 0.6874 0.6556 0.5351 0.5305 
Egypt 0.5514 0.5436 0.5535 0.5937 0.5643 0.5762 0.6102 0.5946 0.5229 0.5422 
El Salvador 0.5270 0.5269 0.5456 0.7223 0.5551 0.5683 0.5935 0.5826 0.5184 0.5183 
Estonia 0.5379 0.5402 0.5808 0.6363 0.6111 0.6466 0.7270 0.7070 0.5233 0.5248 
Finland 0.5273 0.5283 0.5513 0.8481 0.5634 0.5741 0.6049 0.5892 0.5171 0.5553 
France 0.5705 0.5788 0.6255 1.0000 0.6426 0.6665 0.7482 0.7715 0.7026 1.0000 
Germany 0.7342 0.7366 0.8408 0.6841 0.8525 0.8714 0.9199 0.8288 0.6295 0.7734 
Greece 0.5376 0.5445 0.5653 0.6093 0.5895 0.6014 0.6244 0.6555 0.8325 0.6143 
Guatemala 0.5301 0.5312 0.5492 0.5924 0.5635 0.5773 0.6107 0.6006 0.5204 0.5277 
Honduras 0.5282 0.5284 0.5483 0.5152 0.5592 0.5755 0.5984 0.5901 0.5263 0.5259 
Iceland 0.5023 0.5025 0.5048 0.9245 0.5082 0.5097 0.5155 0.5102 0.5017 0.5025 
India 0.6781 0.6722 0.7215 0.7011 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5493 1.0000 
Indonesia 0.5541 0.5576 0.5970 0.5990 0.6049 0.6384 0.6929 0.6655 0.5354 0.5908 
Ireland 0.5130 0.5147 0.5304 0.8777 0.5421 0.5540 0.5898 0.5758 0.5116 0.5499 
Italy 0.5860 0.5855 0.6536 1.0000 0.6745 0.6862 0.7546 0.7470 0.5749 0.8267 
Japan 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6332 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Jordan 0.5373 0.5366 0.5588 0.8390 0.5761 0.5897 0.6137 0.6075 0.5256 0.5258 
Kenya 0.6611 0.6382 0.7682 0.7356 0.6146 0.6427 0.6938 0.6550 0.5330 0.5312 
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Latvia 0.5451 0.5476 0.6079 0.7508 0.6282 0.6593 0.7261 0.7009 0.5377 0.5384 
Luxembourg 1.0000 0.5350 0.5687 0.6134 0.5920 0.6120 0.6663 0.6699 1.0000 1.0000 
Malaysia 0.5305 0.5306 0.5511 1.0000 0.5605 0.5722 0.6050 0.6027 0.5235 0.5490 
Mauritius 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6609 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5825 0.5990 
Mexico 0.5444 0.5430 0.5623 1.0000 0.5739 0.5891 0.6195 0.6138 0.5238 0.6881 
Namibia 0.6708 0.6313 0.8411 0.6476 0.8129 0.7990 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Netherlands 0.5298 0.5362 0.5489 0.6833 0.5626 0.5734 0.5996 0.6118 0.6034 0.7492 
New Zealand 0.5383 0.5406 0.5785 0.5639 0.6031 0.6051 0.6497 0.6066 0.5210 0.5257 
Nicaragua 0.5176 0.5187 0.5319 0.7852 0.5392 0.5503 0.5682 0.5603 0.5168 0.5178 
Norway 0.5576 0.5584 0.5988 0.7041 0.6265 0.6495 0.7016 0.7080 0.5269 0.6049 
Pakistan 0.5504 0.5523 0.5899 0.7495 0.6144 0.6359 0.6944 0.6475 0.5381 0.5574 
Panama 0.5974 0.5834 0.6233 0.7196 0.6257 0.6407 0.6802 0.6462 0.5293 0.5260 
Peru 0.5753 0.5692 0.6024 0.6066 0.6155 0.6355 0.6815 0.6554 0.5286 0.5275 
Philippines 0.5316 0.5317 0.5489 0.6664 0.5613 0.5807 0.6234 0.6098 0.5235 0.5258 
Poland 0.5483 0.5458 0.5713 0.5616 0.5955 0.6141 0.6722 0.6612 0.5304 0.5844 
Portugal 0.5103 0.5110 0.5225 0.7815 0.5282 0.5341 0.5529 0.5410 0.5083 0.5424 
Romania 0.5666 0.5800 0.6437 0.9719 0.6995 0.7145 0.8459 0.8407 0.5526 0.5448 
Russian Federation 0.6294 0.6465 0.7023 1.0000 0.8048 0.8843 1.0000 1.0000 0.6036 1.0000 
Senegal 0.7594 0.7375 1.0000 0.8312 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
South Africa 0.5853 0.5688 0.6385 0.6998 0.6676 0.6773 0.7257 0.6535 0.5305 0.5456 
Spain 0.5350 0.5416 0.5671 0.6702 0.5844 0.6022 0.6530 0.6651 0.5563 1.0000 
Sweden 0.5333 0.5338 0.5627 0.6519 0.5760 0.5879 0.6174 0.5909 0.5174 0.5626 
Switzerland 0.5326 0.5328 0.5564 0.6299 0.5652 0.5740 0.5977 0.5818 0.5206 0.6154 
Thailand 0.5363 0.5361 0.5580 0.6506 0.5664 0.5812 0.6172 0.6035 0.5226 0.5562 
Tunisia 0.5440 0.5401 0.5691 0.6969 0.5752 0.5828 0.6130 0.5969 0.5192 0.5176 
Turkey 0.5371 0.5399 0.5746 0.6740 0.6079 0.6219 0.6804 0.6653 0.5374 0.6303 
Ukraine 0.5386 0.5402 0.5702 0.8420 0.6140 0.6497 0.7336 0.7126 0.5297 0.5296 
United Kingdom 0.5817 0.5836 0.6373 1.0000 0.6567 0.6805 0.7502 0.7271 0.5543 0.8201 
United States 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7544 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Uruguay 0.6211 0.5721 0.6230 0.6347 0.6607 0.7160 0.8525 0.8679 0.5418 0.5441 
Venezuela 0.5576 0.5385 0.5511 0.6643 0.5815 0.6032 0.6440 0.6428 0.5404 0.5809 
Vietnam 0.5620 0.5560 0.5836 0.9886 0.5884 0.6006 0.6268 0.6131 0.5234 0.5199 
Mean 0.6021 0.5877 0.6201 0.7322 0.6383 0.6560 0.7050 0.6916 0.5845 0.6417 
Max 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Min 0.5023 0.5025 0.5048 0.5152 0.5082 0.5097 0.5155 0.5102 0.5017 0.5025 
Std 0.1317 0.1140 0.1159 0.1296 0.1202 0.1191 0.1284 0.1314 0.1390 0.1729 
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Figure 1: Descriptive analysis of countries’ environmental performance    
conditional to their public sector transparency levels for the period 2001-2010. 
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In order to quantify if the effect of corruption has significant influence 
on countries’ environmental efficiency levels over the years we apply the 
nonparametric test for equality of distributions between the obtained 
efficiency scores. Li et al. (2009) created a test for equality of two density or 
two conditional density functions defined over mixed discrete or continuous 
data. By using least squares cross-validation techniques for smoothing 
parameters they illustrate how to use bootstrap methods for obtaining the 
statistic’s null distribution in finite-sample setting.  
Table 2 illustrates the results obtained following the test of equality. 
According to the test the null hypothesis suggests that the distributions under 
consideration are equal. As can be observed the results indicate that the 
conditional to countries’ corruption levels environmental efficiency scores are 
having in the majority of the cases unequal distributions over the examined 
years.  
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Table 2: Consistent density equality test for conditional environmental 
efficiency scores 
 
However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in six cases (when 
comparing the efficiencies between 2001-2002, 2003-2005, 2004-2007, 2005-
2006, 2007-2008 and for 2009-2010). In any case the results reveal that during 
the examined periods variations of countries’ environmental performance 
levels have been occurred which are subject to countries’ corruption levels 
variations over the years (since we are looking at the conditional efficiency 
estimates).  
Moreover, in contrast to table 1 we split our original sample according 
to IMF Advanced Economies List (2012) into countries forming a sample of 
advanced/developed economies (24 countries in our case) and into a sample 
formed by countries from emerging/developing economies (44 countries). 
Thus we conduct an analysis comparing countries’ conditional to their 
transparency levels environmental performances  EP Z  from the same 
development stage. Analysing first the advanced-developed economies (table 
3) we realise that over the years the countries with the highest positive 
percentage change on their  EP are Spain (87%), and Canada (75%) whereas 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2001 1.479 4.521*** 23.964*** 10.715*** 15.267*** 23.167*** 19.976*** 0.232** 0.250 
2002  6.749*** 23.419*** 13.574*** 16.389*** 24.167*** 21.294*** -1.063** -0.345* 
2003   15.434***  0.662  4.155***  13.206*** 10.796***  16.391***  8.008***  
2004    12.402***  6.832***  0.497 3.264**  35.662***  23.630***  
2005     0.451   6.592*** 5.593**  25.186***  13.327*** 
2006      3.537**    1.765*  29.941*** 17.449***  
2007        1.717  35.220***  22.501***  
2008        30.383***  18.892***  
2009         4.059 
*** p-value  < 0.001., ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1 
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two countries are reported to have a negative EP change over the examined 
period (Estonia and New Zealand).  
Similarly table 4 presents the results for the emerging-developing 
economies. The highest positive EP percentage changes are reported for Brazil 
(71%), Russian Federation (58%) and China (52%). However and in contrast 
with the previous sample (advanced-developed economies) more countries are 
reported to have a negative percentage change over the years with the highest 
negative changes to be reported for Bolivia (-46%), Azerbaijan (-43%) and 
Mauritius (-40%).   
  Having calculated countries’ conditional environmental performances 
we assume that their transparency levels directly influence the shape of their 
environmental production frontier (therefore the separability condition is not 
assumed). In this way we can analyse the influence of countries’ public sector 
transparency levels as has been argued in our theoretical model in a second 
stage nonparametric regression analysis.  
Following Racine (2008) we treat countries’ ZEP and their 
transparency levels as continues variables in a nonparametric regression 
analysis based upon least squares cross validation (LSCV) criterion for 
bandwidth selection14. Figure 2 presents the results obtained from our 
nonparametric second stage analysis. Specifically, subfigure 2a presents the 
underlined relationship for all countries under examination regardless their 
economic development level. As can be realized for transparency values 
                                               
14 In addition a bootstrap consistent significance test for continuous regressors introduced by 
Racine (1997) and Li and Racine (2007) was applied in order to test the significance of 
countries’ public sector transparency levels on their obtained environmental performances. 
The obtained p-values indicated that transparency is significant at the conventional 5% level 
for all the samples of our analysis. 
 - 21 - 
between 0 and 2 we observe a positive effect of transparency indicated by an 
increasing regression line and a positive derivative.  
 
Table 3: Average environmental performance values and percentage 
performance changes for Advanced –Developed Economies  
 
Advanced-Developed Economies (24 countries) 
Countries Average EP|Ζ (2001-2010) EP|Ζ percentage change (2001-2010) 
Austria 0.5699 9.9238 
Belgium 0.6473 13.9250 
Canada 0.6339 75.5061 
Czech Republic 0.5743 0.7768 
Denmark 0.5578 7.8532 
Estonia 0.6035 -2.4354 
Finland 0.5859 5.3101 
France 0.7306 75.2848 
Germany 0.7871 5.3391 
Greece 0.6174 14.2671 
Iceland 0.5482 0.0398 
Ireland 0.5759 7.1930 
Italy 0.7089 41.0751 
Japan 0.9633 0.0000 
Luxembourg 0.7257 0.0000 
Netherlands 0.5998 41.4119 
New Zealand 0.5733 -2.3407 
Norway 0.6236 8.4828 
Portugal 0.5532 6.2904 
Spain 0.6375 86.9159 
Sweden 0.5734 5.4941 
Switzerland 0.5706 15.5464 
United Kingdom 0.6992 40.9833 
United States 0.9754 0.0000 
Mean 0.6515 19.0351 
Max 0.9754 86.9159 
Min 0.5482 -2.4354 
Std 0.1172 26.6789 
 
Table 4: Average environmental performance values and percentage 
performance changes for Emerging –Developing Economies  
 
Emerging -Developing Economies (44 countries) 
Countries Average EP|Ζ (2001-2010) EP|Ζ percentage change (2001-2010) 
Argentina 0.5738 -0.2586 
Azerbaijan 0.6801 -43.3992 
Bangladesh 0.5715 -6.0545 
Bolivia 0.7101 -46.5400 
Botswana 0.6333 -6.5913 
Brazil 0.6616 71.0939 
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Bulgaria 0.6792 -14.4357 
Chile 0.6263 -5.1420 
China 0.7587 52.5510 
Colombia 0.6224 -10.3898 
Costa Rica 0.6073 -6.0767 
Croatia 0.6072 -6.5110 
Dominican Republic 0.5715 -2.4230 
Ecuador 0.6058 -7.2552 
Egypt 0.5653 -1.6685 
El Salvador 0.5658 -1.6509 
Guatemala 0.5603 -0.4527 
Honduras 0.5496 -0.4354 
India 0.8322 47.4709 
Indonesia 0.6036 6.6234 
Jordan 0.5910 -2.1403 
Kenya 0.6473 -19.6491 
Latvia 0.6242 -1.2291 
Malaysia 0.6025 3.4873 
Mauritius 0.8842 -40.1000 
Mexico 0.6258 26.3960 
Namibia 0.8403 49.0757 
Nicaragua 0.5606 0.0386 
Pakistan 0.6130 1.2718 
Panama 0.6172 -11.9518 
Peru 0.5998 -8.3087 
Philippines 0.5703 -1.0910 
Poland 0.5885 6.5840 
Romania 0.6960 -3.8475 
Russian Federation 0.8271 58.8815 
Senegal 0.9328 31.6829 
South Africa 0.6293 -6.7828 
Thailand 0.5728 3.7106 
Tunisia 0.5755 -4.8529 
Turkey 0.6069 17.3524 
Ukraine 0.6260 -1.6710 
Uruguay 0.6634 -12.3974 
Venezuela 0.5904 4.1786 
Vietnam 0.6162 -7.4911 
Mean 0.6429 2.2637 
Max 0.9328 71.0939 
Min 0.5496 -46.5400 
Std 0.0918 24.1023 
 
However after that point we have a small decrease and again for a large 
part we have an increasing regression line up to a certain transparency level 
(4.6). After that point again we observe a decreasing regression line (negative 
derivative) and then after a certain level of countries’ transparency (6) we 
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observe an increasing regression line indicating a positive effect on 
environmental performance.  
A final turning point is reported at 7.4 countries’ public sector 
transparency level whereas after that point and with larger values of countries 
public sector transparency levels we have a decreasing regression with 
negative derivative indicating that the effect is negative. As can be realized 
we have mixed effects of countries’ transparency levels due to the fact that 
the sample contains countries on different development stages. However, we 
can conclude that our empirical findings support the theoretical models 
suggested by several authors indicating a nonlinear relationship between 
countries’ corruption levels and environmental quality. 
Similarly, subfigure 2b presents the findings for the sample of the 
advanced-developed countries. As can be realized for a large part of the range 
of the transparency levels we have a positive influence indicated by an 
increasing regression line and a positive derivative up to a certain turning 
point (6.9). After that we have a decreasing regression line indicating a 
negative effect. As can be observed for the advanced and developed economies 
we have an indication of an inverted “U” shape relationship between their 
public sector transparency levels and their obtained environmental 
performance levels. Finally, subfigure 2c indicates an inverted “W” shape 
relationship for emerging and developing countries with two distinct turning 
points (1.9 and 3.6). As can be realized the empirical findings from our 
nonparametric analysis indicate a nonlinear relationship between 
environmental performance and public sector transparency levels.    
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Figure 2: The effect of public sector transparency levels on countries’ 
environmental performance 
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5. Conclusions 
Our paper proposes an empirical model investigating the relationship 
between countries’ public sector transparency levels and their environmental 
performance in carbon dioxide emissions.  In an empirical nonparametric 
setting our paper extents the model by Färe and Grosskopf (2004) and by 
using the conditional directional distance measures as introduced by Simar 
and Vanhems (2012) develops a conditional directional distance model 
measuring countries’ environmental performance under the effect of countries’ 
public sector transparency levels.  
In a second stage of a nonparametric regression analysis, our results 
reveal an inverted ‘U’ shape relationship between advanced and developed 
countries’ environmental performance and public sector transparency levels. 
However in the case of emerging-developing countries the relationship 
between countries’ environmental performance and their public sector 
transparency reveals an inverted ‘W’ shape.  
Our empirical findings provide evidence for several other studies 
(Damania, 2001, 2002; Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; 
Fredriksson et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004; Fredriksson et al., 
2004) investigating the relationship between countries’ environmental policy 
and public corruption levels. 
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